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  Zsófia	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  and	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Heavily	   indebted	   and	   in	   the	   throes	   of	   drastic	   austerity	   programmes,	  
Italy	   and	   Ireland	   find	   themselves	   much	   in	   the	   same	   situation	   as	   a	  
quarter	  of	  a	  century	  ago.	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  early	  
1990s,	   the	   two	   countries	   carried	   out	   successful	   fiscal	   and	   economic	  
stabilization	  programmes	  that	  elicited	  intense	  attention	  from	  scholars	  
of	  economic	  adjustment.	  The	  recurrence	  of	  the	  two	  countries’	  troubles	  
provides	   an	   exceptional	   opportunity	   to	   put	   theories	   of	   economic	  
adjustment	   to	   test.	   Comparative	   analyses	   of	   the	   earlier	   instances	   of	  
stabilization	   concentrated	   on	   the	   similarities	   between	   the	   two	   cases	  
and	   converged	   on	   emphasizing	   the	   importance	   of	   social	   pacts	   in	  
allowing	  successful	  reform.	  In	  contrast,	  this	  paper	  shows	  that	  already	  a	  
quarter	   century	   ago,	   the	   two	   countries	   followed	   very	   different	  
trajectories	  to	  stabilization	  despite	  the	  institutional	  similarities	  of	  the	  
solutions	   they	   adopted.	   It	   argues	   that	   fundamental	   differences	   in	   the	  
two	  countries’	  societal	  structure	  –	  more	  specifically,	  differences	  in	  the	  
level	  of	  socio-­economic	  polarization	  –	  are	  crucial	  in	  understanding	  the	  
differences	   in	   the	   two	   countries’	   ability	   to	   renegotiate	   redistributive	  
arrangements	  and	  thus	  to	  carry	  out	  successful	  adjustment	  then	  as	  now.	  	  
Introduction	  	  
	  How	  fast	  do	  countries	  adjust	  to	  fiscal	  challenges?	  In	  the	  early	  1980s,	  Ireland	  and	  Italy	   faced	   similar	   fiscal	   difficulties,	   as	   economic	   shocks	   had	   slowed	   growth,	  raised	   unemployment	   and	   created	   major	   budgetary	   imbalances.	   These	  difficulties	   were	   compounded	   by	   failed	   attempts	   to	   boost	   growth	   through	  Keynesian	   fiscal	   expansion	   and	   by	   increasing	   financing	   costs.	   Both	   countries	  piled	  up	  debt	   at	   an	   alarming	   rate.	   Ireland	   responded	   to	   its	   problems	   a	   decade	  ahead	   of	   Italy.	   It	   adopted	   a	   radical	   stabilization	   programme	   as	   early	   as	   1982,	  which	   it	   reinforced	   with	   a	   second	   one	   in	   1987.	   In	   Italy,	   no	   correction	   was	  attempted	  until	  1992	  despite	   the	  anxious	  discourse	  about	   the	  pressing	  need	  to	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rein	   in	   the	   growth	   of	   debt	   throughout	   the	   1980s.	   The	   delay	   cost	   Italy	   dearly:	  although	  it	  started	  out	  with	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  debt	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  than	  Ireland	  and	  it	  was	  also	  luckier	  as	  far	  as	  the	  increases	  in	  financing	  costs	  were	  concerned,	  it	   piled	   up	   a	   larger	   stock	   of	   debt	   and	   consequently	   needed	   a	   much	   larger	  adjustment	  once	   it	   finally	  managed	   to	   face	  up	   to	   its	   fiscal	   problems.	   (Figure	  1.	  shows	  the	  timing	  and	  the	  size	  of	  adjustment	  packages	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  along	  with	  their	  debt	  trajectories.)	  Why	  did	  Italy	  react	  so	  much	  slower1?	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  –	  Debt	  trajectories	  and	  adjustment	  packages	  in	  Ireland	  and	  Italy	  from	  1980	  to	  2000	  (Left	  axis:	  size	  of	  the	  adjustment	  package	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP,	  right	  axis:	  debt	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP)	  Source:	  Devries	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  and	  Ameco	  	  This	   paper	   argues	   that	   Italy	   was	   much	   slower	   in	   responding	   to	   its	   fiscal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   As	   the	   debate	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   Great	   Recession	   amply	   shows,	   there	   is	   considerable	   disagreement	  amongst	  economists	  about	  the	  best	  way	  to	  regain	  control	  over	  debt	  growth	  after	  large	  economic	  shocks	  to	  public	  finances.	  While	  some	  advocate	  austerity	  to	  close	  the	  budgetary	  gap,	  increase	  investor	  confidence	  and	  improve	  growth	  prospects	  (e.g.	  Alesina	  and	  Ardagna	  2009,	  Alesina	  2010,	  Kumar	  and	  Woo	  2010,	  Reinhart	  and	  Rogoff	  2010),	  others	  suggest	  expansionary	  policies	  to	  help	  countries	  “grow	  out”	  of	  their	  debt	  (for	  the	  original	  argument,	  see	  Domar	  1944;	  for	  a	  recent	  application,	  see	  Eggertsson	  and	  Krugman	  2012).	  Nothing	  is	  farther	  from	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  than	  to	  take	  sides	  in	  this	  debate.	  Nor	  does	  the	  paper	  attempt	  to	  add	  to	  the	  rich	  literature	  on	  why	  Keynesian	  attempts	  to	  jump-­‐start	  growth	  gave	  way	  to	  austerity	  by	  the	  early-­‐1980s	   in	   Italy	   and	   Ireland	   as	  well	   as	   several	   other	   advanced	   industrial	   economies	   (MvNamara	   1998).	   It	  simply	   seeks	   to	   understand	   why	   it	   took	   Italy	   a	   decade	   longer	   to	   address	   the	   problem	   of	   growing	   debt	  despite	  the	  large	  costs	  of	  delay.	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problems	  than	  Ireland,	  because	  its	  socio-­‐economic	  structure	  made	  it	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  reach	  a	  viable	  compromise	  about	  how	  to	  distribute	  the	  fiscal	  pain	  of	  austerity.	  Italy’s	  socio-­‐economic	  structure	  is	  highly	  polarized:	  it	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  few	  large,	  powerful,	  monolithic	  socio-­‐economic	  blocs,	  each	  with	  a	  very	  distinct	  set	  of	  fiscal	  preferences	  and	  each	  able	  to	  stand	  its	  ground	  in	  the	  political	   struggle.	  Conflicts	   about	   the	  desirable	  mix	  of	   tax	   increases	  and/or	  spending	   cuts	   between	   these	   powerful	   social	   groups	   stood	   in	   the	   way	   of	  adopting	  an	  effective	   stabilization	  package.	   In	   Ireland,	   conflicts	  of	   interests	  are	  more	   diffuse.	   Society	   is	  much	   less	   polarized,	  making	   it	  much	  more	   difficult	   to	  distribute	  fiscal	  pain	  unequally	  than	  in	  Italy.	  This	  made	  it	  much	  easier	  to	  achieve	  general	  societal	  acquiescence	  in	  painful	  policy	  adjustments	  in	  Ireland.	  	  By	  emphasizing	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  two	  countries’	  socio-­‐economic	  structures	  to	  explain	  their	  differing	  post-­‐oil	  crisis	  adjustment	  trajectories,	  the	  paper	  offers	  an	  important	  complement	  to	  an	  already	  extensive	  political	  economic	  scholarship	  on	  policy	  responses	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  fiscal	  challenges	  of	  the	  1980s	  in	  Ireland	  and	   Italy2.	   Earlier	   studies	   focused	   on	   the	   similarities	   in	   the	   two	   tales	   of	  adjustment	  and	  emphasized	  the	  parallels	  in	  institutional	  reforms	  and	  ideational	  innovations	  that	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  successful	  tripartite	  agreements	  between	  the	  state,	   employers	   and	   labour	   in	   the	   two	   countries,	  which	  had	  both	   traditionally	  lacked	  the	  types	  of	  institutional	  frameworks	  that	  are	  commonly	  associated	  with	  effective	  policy	  adjustment.	  This	  paper	  concentrates	  on	  the	  differences	  in	  timing.	  Given	  that	  delay	  in	  fiscal	  consolidation	  leads	  to	  very	  significant	  fiscal,	  economic	  and	  social	  costs,	  it	  is	  worth	  asking	  why	  one	  country	  is	  able	  to	  adjust	  faster	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Baccaro	  and	  Lim	  (2007),	  Baccaro	  and	  Simoni	  (2008	  and	  2010),	  Culpepper	  (2002	  and	  2008).	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the	   other.	   Through	   offering	   a	   complementary	   account	   of	   the	   two	   countries’	  adjustment	  experiences,	  the	  paper	  also	  seeks	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  larger	  debate	  in	   comparative	   political	   economy	   about	   the	   relative	   importance	   of	   socio-­‐economic	  structures,	   institutions	  and	   interests	   in	  determining	  policy	  responses	  to	  profound	  changes	  in	  the	  economic	  environment.	  	  The	  next,	  theoretical	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  discusses	  this	  debate,	  explains	  how	  the	  analysis	   of	   societal	   structures	   can	  be	   applied	   to	   the	   issue	  of	   fiscal	   stabilization	  and	  contemplates	  methodological	   issues	   that	  arise	  when	  an	  argument	   involves	  unobservable	  units	  like	  societal	  groups.	  The	  third	  section	  discusses	  Ireland	  and	  Italy's	   historical	   experiences	   with	   fiscal	   stabilization	   after	   the	   oil	   crises	   and	  explains	  the	  large	  temporal	  discrepancy	  in	  their	  adjustment	  patterns.	  The	  fourth	  section	  investigates	  how	  the	  argument	  applies	  to	  adjustment	  in	  both	  countries	  in	  the	   wake	   of	   the	   Great	   Recession.	   The	   conclusion	   spells	   out	   the	   theoretical	  implications	   of	   the	   argument	   for	   debates	   between	   structuralist,	   institutionalist	  and	  ideationalist	  approaches	  to	  policy	  adjustment	  and	  the	  practical	  implications	  for	   the	   fiscal	   predicament	   that	   many	   developed	   countries	   find	   themselves	   in	  today.	  	  
Theoretical	  considerations	  about	  the	  politics	  of	  fiscal	  adjustment	  	  When	   the	   economic	   environment	   changes	   for	   the	   worse	   –	   growth	   slows,	  unemployment	   increases	  or	  global	   interest	   rates	  soar	  –	   large	  gaps	  are	   likely	   to	  appear	  even	  in	  previously	  balanced	  budgets	  as	  tax	  revenues	  drop	  and	  automatic	  spending	   items	   (e.g.	   entitlements	   or	   interest	   payments	   on	   outstanding	   debt)	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grow.	  If	  the	  adverse	  changes	  are	  lasting,	  only	  major	  adjustments	  to	  spending	  and	  taxes	   can	   stem	   the	   sustained	   accumulation	   of	   debt.	   The	   speed	   of	   such	   fiscal	  consolidation	   is	   critical,	   because	   delay	   can	   magnify	   the	   problem	   to	  unmanageable	  proportions	  or	   at	   the	   very	   least	  make	  adjustment	   exponentially	  harder	   due	   to	   the	   self-­‐reinforcing	   cycles	   of	   growing	   debt,	   rising	   interest	   costs	  and	  widening	  deficits.	  No	  matter	  how	  large	  the	  initial	  imbalance	  was,	  a	  country	  is	  always	  better	  off	  acting	  fast	  than	  postponing	  adjustment.	  	  In	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   oil	   crises,	   Ireland	   and	   Italy	   –	   along	   with	   several	   other	  advanced	   industrial	   countries	   –	   faced	   exactly	   such	   economic	   and	   fiscal	  challenges3.	   After	   failed	   attempts	   to	   return	   to	   earlier	   higher	   growth	   paths	   and	  lower	   levels	   of	   unemployment	   through	   Keynesian	   demand	   stimulus,	   austerity	  became	   the	  order	  of	   the	  day	   to	  deal	  with	   sustained	  debt	  accumulation.	   Ireland	  was	  among	  the	  countries	  (along	  with	  Denmark	  and	  Austria)	  that	  reacted	  swiftly,	  raising	   taxes	   and	   cutting	   expenditure	   drastically.	   Italy,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  was	  among	   the	   laggards	   (along	   with	   Canada).	   It	   shied	   away	   from	   significant	  adjustment	  and	  borrowed	  persistently	  for	  decades,	  accumulating	  daunting	  levels	  of	  debt.	  Understanding	  the	  difference	  between	  those	  who	  responded	  decisively	  and	  those	  who	  procrastinated	  in	  the	  face	  of	  swelling	  debt	  is	  important	  in	  order	  to	   assess	   how	   prosperous	   developed	   countries	   might	   deal	   with	   their	   debt	  problems	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Great	  Recession.	  	  
	  
The	  literature	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Roubini	  and	  Sachs	  (1989),	  Mussa	  and	  Masson	  (1995)	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The	   extensive	   comparative	   political	   economic	   research	   that	   has	   sought	   to	  understand	  how	  countries	  adapt	  their	  policies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  profound	  economic	  changes	   has	   taken	   little	   interest	   in	   the	   area	   of	   public	   finance	   in	   and	   of	   itself.	  Questions	   concerning	   taxation,	   spending	   and	   budgetary	   imbalances	   have	   often	  been	   taken	   into	   consideration	   as	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   adjustment	   to	   novel	  economic,	   demographic	   and	   social	   conditions,	   along	   with	   issues	   of	   welfare	  reforms,	   changes	   in	   industrial	   relations,	   new	  monetary	   policy	   regimes	   and	   the	  like.	   However,	   the	   problem	   of	   how	   different	   countries	   bring	   runaway	   debt	  growth	  under	  control	  after	  economic	  shocks	  knock	  public	  finances	  out	  of	  balance	  has	  not	  received	  specific	  attention.	  Consequently,	  while	  several	  elements	  of	  the	  
content	  and	  form	  of	  fiscal	  adjustments	  have	  been	  considered,	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  political	   mechanism	   surrounding	   fiscal	   consolidation	   have	   not	   been	  systematically	  mapped	  out	  and	  the	  timing	  (or	  speed)	  of	  adjustment	  in	  particular	  has	  not	  been	  investigated.	  	  While	   they	   do	   not	   offer	   ready-­‐made	   hypotheses	   for	   the	   identifying	   the	   major	  factors	   that	   determine	   cross-­‐national	   variation	   in	   fiscal	   adjustment,	   these	  literatures	   obviously	   provide	   important	   building	   blocks	   for	   generating	   an	  explanation	   for	   the	   discrepancies	   between	   Ireland	   and	   Italy’s	   adjustment	  experiences.	   Institutionalist,	   ideationalist	   and	   structuralist	   approaches	   take	  different	   views	   on	   how	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   surrounding	   policy	   making	   are	  sorted	   out	   in	   different	   countries	   to	   yield	   different	   policy	   choices.	   The	  institutionalist	  approach	  implicitly	  assumes	  that	  societal	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  are	  similar	  across	  all	  countries	  of	  similar	  levels	  of	  development,	  and	  therefore	  cross-­‐national	   differences	   in	   policy	   responses	   to	   similar	   challenges	   arise	   from	   how	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conflicts	   are	  mediated	   by	   diverse	   institutions4.	   In	   the	   ideas-­‐focused	   variant	   of	  institutionalism5,	   ideologies,	  policy	  paradigms	  and	  shared	  conceptions	  of	  policy	  issues	  affect	  policy	  choice	  in	  interaction	  with	  institutions	  by	  determining	  the	  way	  in	   which	   different	   political	   actors	   conceptualize	   their	   interests6.	   In	   contrast,	  structuralists	  explicitly	  emphasize	  that	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  and	  power	  relations	  between	   social	   groups	   vary	   across	   countries	   depending	   on	   a	   host	   of	   non-­‐institutional	   factors	   (such	   as	   resource	   endowments,	   economic	   openness	   or	  demography)7.	  For	  these	  authors,	  social	  structure	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  coalitions	  between	  different	  social	  groups	  with	  divergent	  interests	  have	  analytical	  primacy	  in	  explaining	  policy	  variation.	  	  	  Institutional	   approaches	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   take	   us	   very	   far	   in	   explaining	   the	  differences	  between	   Ireland	  and	   Italy’s	  adjustment	  patterns.	   In	   fact,	   the	  reason	  why	   the	   comparison	  of	   the	   two	   countries	   adjustment	   patterns	   has	   received	   so	  much	  attention	  from	  comparative	  political	  economists	   is	  because	  the	  two	  cases	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  so	  similar	  –	  and	  so	  similarly	  anomalous	  –	  from	  an	  institutionalist	  perspective.	  Both	  countries	  had	  electoral	   institutions	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  strong	   presence	   of	   political	   strife	   in	   the	   policy	  making	   sphere	   and	   the	   lack	   of	  insulation	   of	   policy	   making	   from	   particularistic	   interests8,	   with	   insufficient	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Thelen	  and	  Steinmo	  1992,	  Pontusson	  1995	  5	   This	   approach	   is	   also	   often	   called	   discursive	   institutionalist,	   or	   constructivist-­‐institutionalist	   (Schmidt	  2010,	  Hay	  2010).	  6	  Yee	  (1996),	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Hay	  (2010)	  7	  Gourevitch	  (1986),	  Rogowski	  (1989)	  Frieden	  (1991a,	  1991b,	  1996,	  2002	  and	  2010),	  Clayton	  and	  Pontusson	  1998,	  Hiscox	  (2001),	  Hausermann	  (2010)	  8	   Both	   countries	   had	   proportional	   electoral	   systems	  with	   a	   preference	   vote	   scheme,	   a	   system	   known	   to	  encourage	   pork-­‐barrel	   politics	   and	   the	   excessive	   representation	   of	   particularistic	   interests	   in	   the	   policy	  making	   arena.	   Indeed,	   commentators	   often	   note	   the	   special	   importance	   of	   patronage	   and	   clientelistic	  decision	   making	   in	   both	   Irish	   and	   Italian	   political	   life	   in	   this	   period	   (Carty	   1981,	   O’Malley	   et	   al	   2012,	  Ginsborg	   1990,	   Cox	   and	   McCubbins	   2001).	   Neither	   country	   had	   strong	   unitary	   governments	   that	   are	  commonly	  associated	  with	  decisive	  adjustment	  (Roubini	  and	  Sachs	  1989,	  Spolaore	  1999).	  Instead,	  a	  series	  of	   coalitions	   of	   the	   same	   five	   parties	   held	   power	   in	   Italy,	   whereas	   two-­‐party	   coalitions	   alternated	   with	  externally	  supported	  minority	  governments	  in	  Ireland.	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corporatist	   institutions	   to	   handle	   class	   conflict9,	   with	   a	   weak	   state10	   and	   –	  consequently	  –	  with	  indecision	  and	  suboptimal	  patchworks	  of	  policies.	  Yet,	  both	  countries	   forcefully	   asserted	   control	   over	   their	   economic	   problems	   through	  comprehensive	   adjustment	   packages	   that	   were	   negotiated	   in	   tripartite	  agreements	  between	  the	  state,	  labour	  and	  employers.	  The	  anomaly	  was	  resolved	  when	  scholars	  pieced	  together	  the	  puzzle	  of	  how	  internal	  institutional	  changes11,	  changing	  government	  partisanship12	  and	  greater	  willingness	  to	  involve	  unions	  in	  the	   policy	   design	   process	   made	   unions	   more	   amenable	   to	   compromise	   with	  employers	  and	  to	  cooperation	  with	  the	  government13.	  What	   these	  accounts	  are	  silent	  about,	  though,	  is	  why	  these	  changes	  took	  place	  when	  they	  did	  –	  by	  1987	  in	  Ireland	  and	  1993	  in	  Italy	  –	  and	  why	  Ireland	  was	  already	  able	  to	  put	  into	  place	  a	  radical	   fiscal	   stabilization	   package	   as	   early	   as	   1982	   (five	   years	   before	   the	  momentous	  social	  pact	  was	  achieved).	  	  	  Ideational	   analysis	   also	   uncovers	  more	   similarities	   than	   differences.	   The	   ideas	  held	   by	   policy-­‐making	   elites	   seem	   to	   have	   been	   similar	   in	   both	   countries.	  Neoliberal	   ideas	  about	   the	  need	   for	   fiscal	   rectitude	  and	  controlled	  government	  spending	   gradually	   caught	   on	   in	   both	   countries	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   there	   is	   no	  evidence	  that	  this	  happened	  earlier	   in	  Ireland	  than	  in	  Italy14.	   In	  both	  countries,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Attempts	  at	  corporatist	  policy-­‐coordination	  had	  broken	  down	  in	  both	  countries	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1980s	  (Donaghey	  and	  Teague	  2007,	  Regini	  and	  Regalia	  1997,	  Radaelli	  2000).	  10	  Della	  Sala	  (1997),	  Culpepper	  and	  Regan	  (2014)	  11	  Baccaro	  and	  Simoni	   (2010)	  explain	  how	   the	   internal	  democratization	  of	  union	  structures	  made	  unions	  more	  able	  to	  move	  away	  from	  an	  intransingent	  line	  towards	  compromise.	  	  12	   Baccaro	   and	   Lim	   (2007)	   and	  Baccaro	   and	   Simoni	   (2008)	   point	   out	   that	   partisan	   alignment	  with	  weak	  governments	  was	  also	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  creating	  the	  preconditions	  for	  tripartite	  agreements.	  13	   Culpepper	   (2002)	   emphasizes	   that	   governments	   were	   able	   to	   offer	   better	   compromises	   when	   they	  involved	  unions	  in	  designing	  policy	  adjustment	  from	  the	  start	  allowing	  them	  not	  only	  to	  shape	  the	  content	  of	  the	  agreement,	  but	  also	  to	  build	  internal	  legitimacy	  for	  it.	  14	  In	  fact,	  Honohan	  (1999)	  points	  out	  that	  since	  the	  first	  Irish	  stabilization	  effort	  of	  1982	  was	  based	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  tax	  increases,	  neoliberal	  notions	  might	  have	  pervaded	  policy	  makers	  more	  slowly	  in	  Ireland.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  McNamara	   (1998),	   Radaelli	   (2000)	   and	   Quaglia	   (2004)	   document	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  policy	  consensus	  around	  neoliberal	  ideas	  in	  the	  Banca	  d’Italia	  and	  the	  Treasury	  in	  Italy	  in	  the	  1980s.	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the	   discourse	   on	   fiscal	   policy-­‐making	   was	   dominated	   by	   the	   objective	   of	  “risanamento”	   and	   “recovery”	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   as	   ministers	   and	   central	  bank	  officials	   repeatedly	   called	   for	   the	   stabilization	  public	   finances15.	  As	   far	   as	  the	   approach	   of	   the	   social	   partners	   are	   concerned,	   Culpepper	   emphasises	   that	  agreeing	  on	  the	  common	  goal	  of	  international	  competitiveness	  and	  on	  a	  common	  notion	  of	  policy	  measures	  that	  would	  enhance	  this	  goal	  helped	  to	  create	  a	  focal	  point	  around	  which	  employers	  and	  unions	  could	  build	  cooperative	  settlements	  in	  both	  countries16.	  Again,	   the	  question	   is	  why	  this	  happened	  earlier	   in	   Ireland	  than	  in	  Italy	  and	  why	  Ireland	  was	  able	  to	  embark	  on	  fiscal	  consolidation	  before	  this	  focal	  point	  for	  compromise	  was	  created	  in	  1987.	  	  Structuralist	   approaches	   seem	  more	  promising	   in	   explaining	   the	  differences	   in	  the	  two	  tales	  of	  adjustment,	  because	  the	  two	  countries	  were	  (and	  are)	  obviously	  very	  different	   in	  many	  of	   their	   structural	   features	  both	   in	   economic	   and	   social	  terms.	  First,	  the	  Irish	  economy	  is	  much	  smaller	  and	  more	  open	  than	  the	  Italian.	  Not	  only	  are	  exports	  and	  imports	  much	  more	  significant	   for	  the	  Irish	  economy,	  but	   multinational	   companies	   also	   play	   a	   much	   larger	   role.	   Second,	   the	   Irish	  society	   is	  much	   less	  disaggregated	   in	   socio-­‐economic	   terms	   than	   the	   Italian.	   In	  Ireland,	   the	   deep	   class	   cleavages	   and	   large	   regional	   economic	   differences	   that	  characterise	  the	  Italian	  society	  are	  absent	  or	  infinitely	  milder.	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  not	  immediately	   obvious	   how	   these	   differences	   matter17.	   Structuralist	   authors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Walsh	  1999,	  Radaelli	  2000,	  Honohan	  (1999)	  16	  Culpepper	  2008	  17	  Economists	  would	  perhaps	  argue	   that	   the	  significance	  of	  openness	   is	  clear:	  more	  open	  countries	  suffer	  less	  from	  austerity,	  because	  exports	  and	  imports	  dampen	  the	  recessionary	  consequences	  of	  tightened	  fiscal	  policy.	  What	  is	  not	  obvious,	  however,	  is	  how	  it	  affects	  the	  timing	  of	  adjustment.	  More	  open	  countries	  could	  adjust	   faster,	   because	   the	   aggregate	   costs	   of	   adjustment	   for	   the	   country	   are	   always	   lower.	  However,	   this	  argument	   could	   be	   turned	   around:	   since	   the	   necessary	   adjustment	   increases	   with	   the	   delay,	   less	   open	  economies	   might	   be	   in	   a	   bigger	   rush	   to	   undergo	   the	   painful	   adjustments	   to	   minimize	   the	   recessionary	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emphasize	   a	   whole	   range	   of	   different	   dimensions	   along	   which	   structural	  differentiation	   plays	   a	   role	   for	   policy	   choice	   depending	   on	   their	   theories	   to	  conceptualise	   the	   types	   of	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   that	   surround	   the	   policy	   issue	  area	   they	   investigate18.	   Therefore,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   analyse	   societal	  structures	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	   their	   effect	  on	   fiscal	   adjustment,	   a	   theory	   is	  first	   needed	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   conflicts	   of	   interest	   bearing	   on	   fiscal	  adjustment.	  	  
Socio-­economic	  structures	  and	  fiscal	  adjustment	  
	  The	  so-­‐called	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  of	  fiscal	  stabilization	  analyses	  the	  dynamics	  of	   societal	   conflicts	  governing	   fiscal	  adjustment19.	   It	   starts	   from	   the	  axiom	   that	  different	  groups	  in	  society	  have	  two	  types	  of	  countervailing	  interests	  regarding	  fiscal	   adjustment.	   One	   is	   the	   desire	   not	   to	   have	   to	   bear	   too	  much	   of	   the	   fiscal	  pain.	   When	   a	   large	   hole	   in	   the	   budget	   needs	   to	   be	   plugged,	   this	   can	   be	   done	  through	  many	  different	   combinations	   of	   tax	   increases	   and	   spending	   cuts.	   Each	  social	  group	  prefers	  combinations	  that	  do	  not	  raise	  the	  taxes	  it	  has	  to	  pay	  or	  cut	  the	  spending	  it	  benefits	  from.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  consolidation	  is	  urgent	  for	  social	  groups	  that	  suffer	  from	  possible	  negative	  side	  effects	  of	  fiscal	  problems,	  such	  as	  high	  inflation,	  high	  interest	  rates	  or	  non-­‐credible	  exchange	  rate	  pegs.	  The	  speed	  at	  which	  a	  country	  can	  close	  a	  large	  budgetary	  gap	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  resultant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  consequences.	  Furthermore,	  for	  the	  political	  scientist	  it	  is	  also	  of	  interest	  how	  openness	  affects	  the	  ability	  of	  different	  political	  actors	  to	  reconcile	  their	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  adjustment.	  (This	  was	  also	  the	  motivating	  puzzle	  for	  Katzenstein’s	  Small	  States	  in	  World	  Markets	  (1985).	  18	  Both	  sectoral	  and	  class	  conflicts	  are	  salient	  for	  trade	  and	  monetary	  policy	  (Frieden	  1991,	  Rogowski	  1989,	  Hiscox	   2001),	   skills	   level	   differentiation	   among	   labour	  matters	   for	   social	   insurance	   (Iversen	   and	   Soskice	  2001),	  welfare	  reforms	  are	  shaped	  by	  insider-­‐outsider	  conflicts	  (Rueda	  2005)	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  multiple	  dimensions	  (Hausermann	  2010),	  whereas	  explaining	  profound	  changes	  in	  policy	  regimes	  call	  for	  a	  complex	  system	  of	  flexible	  categorization	  (Gourevitch	  1986).	  19	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen	  1991	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of	   these	   two	   countervailing	   forces:	   conflicts	   about	   the	   composition	   of	   the	  adjustment	  package	  –	  about	   the	  exact	  mix	  of	   tax	   increases	  and	  spending	  cuts	  –	  will	  delay	  consolidation,	  whereas	  the	  urge	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  negative	  side	  effects	  will	  foster	  resolution.	  	  The	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  assumes	  that	  different	  social	  groups	  will	  seek	  to	  shift	  the	  burden	  of	  adjustment	  on	  other	  groups	  by	  resisting	  adjustment	  packages	  that	  hurt	   them,	   in	   the	   hope	   that	   a	  more	   favourable	   adjustment	   package	   can	  be	   put	  into	  place.	  This	  results	  in	  a	  free-­‐riding	  game	  where	  all	  groups	  might	  resist	  fiscal	  sacrifices,	   hoping	   that	   another	   group	   might	   feel	   forced	   to	   foot	   the	   bill	   of	  stabilization.	   While	   such	   a	   stalemate	   lasts,	   the	   debt	   problem	   is	   allowed	   to	  deteriorate	  further	  deteriorate.	  The	  temptation	  to	  attempt	  to	  free	  ride	  on	  other	  groups’	  sacrifices	  is	  stronger	  in	  polities	  where	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  design	  adjustment	  packages	  of	  very	  different	  incidence	  of	  fiscal	  pain.	  Where	  society	  is	  divided	  into	  a	  few	  large	  groups	  with	  significantly	  different	  socio-­‐economic	  characteristics	  –	  this	  is	  what	  Alesina	   and	  Drazen	   call	   polarization	   –	   it	   is	   easier	   to	   come	  up	  with	   tax	  increases	   and	   spending	   cuts	   that	   affect	   some	   groups	   but	   not	   others	   and	   still	  succeed	   in	   closing	   the	   budgetary	   gap.	   In	   more	   diffuse	   societies,	   where	   it	   is	  impossible	  to	  place	  most	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  adjustment	  on	  a	  well-­‐delineable	  group,	  conflict	  is	  weaker,	  because	  the	  stakes	  are	  lower.	  	  	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	   is	  dynamic:	  even	   if	   the	  balance	  of	  countervailing	  forces	  is	  tilted	  towards	  delay	  in	  a	  given	  country,	  the	  delay	  is	  not	  necessary	   infinite.	   Due	   to	   the	   self-­‐reinforcing	   nature	   of	   fiscal	   problems,	   the	  negative	   side	   effects	   are	   expected	   to	   grow	   as	   consolidation	   is	   delayed,	  making	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the	   forces	   pointing	   towards	   resolution	   stronger	   with	   time.	   Therefore,	   even	   in	  countries	  where	   response	   is	   postponed	   initially,	   there	   is	   a	   growing	   chance	   for	  successful	  adjustment	  as	  time	  goes	  by.	  How	  fast	  the	  balance	  tips	  between	  forces	  for	  stalemate	  and	  for	  resolution,	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  polarization,	  but	   also	   on	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   debt	   hurts	   different	   social	   groups	   within	   the	  polity.	  The	  debt	  problem	  deteriorates	   automatically,	   but	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   it	  translates	   into	   negative	   side	   effects	   that	   different	   social	   groups	   in	   the	   polity	  directly	  suffer	  from	  depends	  on	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  the	  given	  country,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  non-­‐fiscal	  policies	  that	  determine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  fiscal	  problems	  affect	   other	   areas.	   The	   urge	   to	   resolve	   fiscal	   problems	   will	   ceteris	   paribus	   be	  greater	   in	   countries	  where	   economic	   factors,	   like	   openness	   to	   trade	   or	   lack	   of	  capital	   inflows	   to	   ease	   the	   crowding	   out	   effect	   of	   government	   borrowing,	  increase	  the	  negative	  side	  effects	  of	  fiscal	  problems.	  Similarly,	  monetary	  policies	  that	  allow	  fiscal	  problems	  to	  translate	  into	  higher	  inflation	  and	  real	  appreciation	  generate	   stronger	   negative	   side	   effects	   that	   deter	   social	   groups	   from	  pursuing	  their	  free-­‐riding	  strategies	  for	  too	  long.	  	  	  In	  sum,	  fiscal	  stabilization	  is	  delayed	  by	  the	  urge	  of	  different	  groups	  in	  society	  to	  shift	   the	   burden	   of	   austerity	   on	   other	   groups.	   The	   delay	   will	   last	   longer,	   the	  greater	  the	  possibility	  for	  very	  unequal	  distributions	  of	  fiscal	  sacrifices,	  which,	  in	  turn	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   the	   case	   in	   polarized	   societies.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  intense	  negative	   side	  effects	  of	  debt	  will	   act	   as	   a	  deterrent	   for	  pursuing	  delay-­‐inducing	   free-­‐riding	   strategies.	   Thus,	   the	   delay	   will	   be	   shorter	   wherever	   debt	  problems	  translate	  directly	  into	  economic	  pain	  for	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  within	  the	  polity.	  In	  this	  model,	  the	  large	  differences	  in	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  structures	  of	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Ireland	   and	   Italy	   directly	   explain	   the	   great	   discrepancy	   in	   the	   timing	   of	  stabilization	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  In	  Ireland,	  low	  levels	  of	  polarization	  decreased	  the	   incentives	   for	   groups	   in	   society	   to	   resist	   painful	   austerity	  measures	   in	   the	  hope	   that	   the	   problem	  will	   be	   solved	   in	   a	  way	   that	   puts	   the	   burden	   on	   other	  groups,	   while	   high	   levels	   of	   economic	   openness	   increased	   the	   urgency	   of	  resolving	   fiscal	   problems.	   In	   Italy,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	  was	   quite	   a	   bit	   of	  room	   to	   distribute	   the	   burden	   unequally	   across	   class	   lines	   and	   regions,	  which	  provided	   strong	   motivation	   for	   groups	   to	   dig	   in	   their	   heels	   and	   reject	  stabilization	  packages	  that	  would	  hurt	  them.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  lower	  exposure	  to	  trade	  made	  such	  strategies	  affordable	   for	  a	   longer	  period	  of	   time.	   In	  the	  end,	   it	  was	   groups	  most	   directly	   exposed	   to	   international	   competition	   that	   broke	   the	  stalemate	  and	  made	  the	  first	  sacrifices	  to	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  fiscal	  stabilization,	  but	  it	  took	  these	  groups	  over	  a	  decade	  to	  give	  up	  their	  resistance	  to	  fiscal	  pain.	  The	  next	  section	  elaborates	  on	  these	  two	  stories	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  
The	  painful	  1980s	  in	  Ireland	  	  In	   Ireland,	   the	   1980s	   were	   a	   decade	   of	   sustained	   fiscal	   corrections.	   These	  reflected	  society-­‐wide	  acquiescence	   in	   the	  necessity	   for	   fiscal	   sacrifices	  both	   in	  the	   political	   circumstances	   among	   which	   they	   were	   passed	   and	   in	   the	   actual	  composition	   of	   the	   austerity	   packages.	   Despite	   much	   posturing	   by	   political	  actors,	  none	  actually	  sabotaged	  the	  stabilization	  effort	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  At	  the	   same	   time,	   the	   consecutive	   austerity	   packages	   spread	   the	   pain	   relatively	  evenly	  across	  broad	  groups	  of	  society.	  The	  first	  drastic	  stabilization	  package	  was	  already	  in	  place	  in	  1982.	  The	  government	  sharply	  increased	  taxes	  on	  households,	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slashed	   public	   investments	   and	   some	   current	   spending20.	   This	   achieved	   a	   six-­‐percentage	  point	  improvement	  in	  the	  structurally	  adjusted	  primary	  balance,	  but	  could	  not	  counterbalance	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  interest	  burden	  and,	  therefore,	  only	  succeeded	  in	  significantly	  slowing	  but	  not	  reversing	  the	  accumulation	  of	  debt21.	  Consequently,	   in	   1987,	   a	   renewed	   effort	  was	  made.	   The	   government	  wage	   bill	  was	   significantly	   squeezed	   via	   a	   hiring	   freeze	   and	   below-­‐inflation	   wage	  increases,	   transfers	   were	   cut,	   spending	   on	   infrastructure	   investments	   were	  further	   reduced22.	  This	   tightening	   in	   spending	  was	   complemented	  by	  a	  one-­‐off	  increase	  in	  revenues	  due	  to	  a	  tax	  amnesty.	  These	  measures	  succeeded	  in	  setting	  the	   debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	   on	   a	   firm	   downward	   path	   for	   the	   longer	   term23.	   This	  section	  seeks	  to	  show	  that	  this	  pattern	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  relative	  homogeneity	  of	  Ireland’s	  socio-­‐economic	  structure	  as	  well	  as	  its	  exposure	  to	  international	  trade	  and	  capital	  movements.	  	  	  Ireland’s	  socio-­‐economic	  homogeneity	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  the	  country’s	  historical	  development.	   The	   secession	   from	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   the	   split	   with	  Northern	   Ireland	   created	   a	   remarkably	   homogenous	   –	   agrarian,	   rural,	   Roman	  Catholic	  –	  society24.	  The	  only	  main	  social-­‐economic-­‐political	  conflict	  of	  the	  time	  of	  secession,	  namely	  the	  degree	  of	  political,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  independence	  from	  UK,	  had	   long	   faded	   in	  relevance	  by	   the	  1980s25.	  After	  economic	  openness	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Alesina	  and	  Perotti	  1996,	  Honohan	  1992	  and	  1999	  21	  Honohan	  1992,	  IMF	  1998	  22	  Alesina	  and	  Perotti	  1996,	  Honohan	  1992	  and	  1999	  23	  While	  fast	  growth	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  Ireland’s	  ability	  to	  reduce	  its	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	   so	   fast,	   it	   does	  not	   diminish	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   stabilization	   efforts	   of	   the	   1980s	   in	   putting	  Ireland	  on	  a	  sustainable	  path.	  The	  two	  waves	  of	  austerity	  of	  the	  1980s	  led	  to	  very	  large	  improvements	  in	  the	  primary	  balance.	  They	  stemmed	  debt	  accumulation	  before	  Ireland’s	  economic	  fortunes	  turned	  for	  the	  better.	  More	   importantly	   for	   the	   question	   addressed	   in	   this	   paper,	   they	   represent	   successful	   efforts	   from	  policy	  makers	  to	  elicit	  significant	  and	  painful	  sacrifices	  from	  society	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  fiscal	  balance.	  24	  Sinnott	  1984,	  Kirby	  2010	  25	  Mair	  1992,	  Laver	  and	  Marsh	  1992	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and	   foreign	   investment	   were	   embraced	   from	   the	   1960s,	   industrialization	   and	  urbanization	   slowly	   took	   off.	   However,	   the	   share	   on	   non-­‐agricultural	  employment	   grew	   only	   slowly	   and	   it	   failed	   to	   create	   an	   acute	   owner-­‐worker	  cleavage26.	  No	  strong,	  unified	  and	  conscious	  working	  class	  emerged,	  the	  Labour	  Party	  remained	  small	  and	  the	  union	  movement	  fragmented	  and	  uncoordinated27.	  This	   is	   hardly	   surprising	   considering	   that	   a	   large	   share	   of	   the	   increase	   in	  industrial	  employment	   took	  place	  via	   foreign	   investment28.	   It	  would	  have	  been	  difficult	   to	   elicit	   major	   concessions	   –	   in	   terms	   of	   pay,	   labour	   regulation	   or	  funding	   expensive	   social	   programmes	   –	   from	  multinationals	   that	   could	   simply	  choose	   to	   exit	   the	   country.	   Although	   income	   inequality	   within	   the	   Irish	  population	  was	  large	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe,	  this	  was	  caused	  by	  mostly	  by	  a	   “long	   thin	   tail”	  of	   the	  distribution	   towards	  higher	   incomes,	  but	   the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  society	  was	  concentrated	  at	  the	  low-­‐end	  of	  the	  income	  scale29.	   This	   limited	   the	   degree	   of	   redistributive	   conflict.	   In	   sum,	   the	   great	  majority	  of	   the	   Irish	  population	  was	   in	   largely	   similar	   socio-­‐economic	  position	  and	   society	   did	   not	   cluster	   into	   large	   homogeneous	   blocs	   around	   diverging	  interests	  towards	  economic	  and	  social	  policy.	  	  	  The	   lack	   of	   deep-­‐seated	   socio-­‐economic	   cleavages	   was	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	  characteristics	   of	   the	   Irish	   party	   system	   and	   in	   the	   political	   context	   of	   fiscal	  stabilization	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Fianna	  Fail	  and	  Fine	  Gael	  –	  who	  between	  them	  shared	  more	  than	  80	  percent	  of	   the	  vote	   in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  –	  both	  drew	  support	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Sinnott	  1984,	  Walsh	  2004,	  Kirby	  2010	  27	  Garvin	  1974,	  Donaghey	  and	  Tegue	  2007	  28	  By	  1973,	  foreign	  firms	  accounted	  for	  a	  third	  of	  manufacturing	  employment	  and	  their	  share	  continued	  to	  grow.	  By	  the	  2000s,	  it	  amounted	  to	  fifty	  percent	  (Kirby	  2010).	  29	  McDonough	  and	  Dundon	  2010	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from	  all	  corners	  of	  society	  and	  their	  voter	  bases	  exhibited	  negligible	  regional	  or	  socio-­‐economic	   differences30.	   The	   only	   party	   with	   a	   distinct	   social	   base	   and	  social	  programme	  –	  the	  Labour	  Party	  –	  remained	  small	  and	  was	  overshadowed	  by	  Fianna	  Fail	  both	  in	  getting	  the	  working	  class	  vote	  and	  in	  nurturing	  links	  with	  trade	   unions31.	   Given	   the	   lack	   of	   differentiation	   of	   their	   voters,	   the	   two	   large	  parties	  did	  not	  focus	  their	  strategies	  on	  kindling	  (re)distributive	  conflicts.	  Their	  programmes	  were	  virtually	  indistinguishable	  on	  economic	  and	  social	  issues32.	  In	  the	   face	   of	  mounting	   fiscal	   troubles	   in	   the	   1980s,	   neither	   party	   could	   credibly	  promise	  to	  large	  groups	  of	  voters	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  that	  would	  shield	  them	  from	  fiscal	   pain.	   Instead,	   they	   both	   had	   an	   interest	   in	   displaying	   their	   economic	  competence	  by	  dealing	  effectively	  with	   the	  problem.	  They	  did	  not	  need	   to	   fear	  long-­‐term	   negative	   electoral	   repercussions,	   as	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   no	   alternative	  strategy	   is	   available	   to	   either	   their	   main	   rival	   or	   to	   potential	   political	  entrepreneurs	  seeking	  to	  enter	  the	  political	  market.	  	  Consequently,	  both	  major	  parties	  were	  bent	  on	  stabilization	  as	   the	  scale	  of	   the	  problem	   revealed	   itself	   by	   1980.	   Fine	   Gael	   and	   Labour	   presented	   Parliament	  with	   an	   austerity	   budget	   with	   large	   tax	   increases	   in	   1981.	   This	   famously	  foundered	   on	   the	   resistance	   of	   independent	   members	   of	   Parliament	   to	   the	  symbolic	  issue	  of	  taxing	  children’s	  shoes,	  bringing	  the	  government	  down33.	  The	  incoming	  minority	   Fianna	   Fail	   government	   proposed	   a	   budget	  with	   significant	  spending	   cuts,	   but	   it	   lacked	   the	   necessary	   external	   support	   to	   have	   it	   passed.	  After	   yet	   another	   round	   of	   elections	   in	   1982,	   the	   new	   Fine	   Gael	   and	   Labour	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Carty	  1976,	  McAllister	  and	  O’Connell	  1984,	  Farrell	  1999	  31	  Sinnott	  1984,	  Mair	  1992	  32	  Mair	  1987,	  Sinnott	  1976,	  Laver	  and	  Hunt	  1992	  33	  Honohan	  1999,	  Hallerberg	  2004	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coalition	  was	  now	  strong	  enough	  to	  pass	  a	  budget	  with	  significant	  tax	  increases	  and	   some	   spending	   cuts,	   which	   successfully	   launched	   the	   first	   round	   of	  stabilization34.	   Fianna	   Fail	   campaigned	   for	   an	   end	   to	   austerity	   in	   the	   1987	  election,	  but	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  formed	  a	  (minority)	  government,	  it	  initiated	  a	  second	  round	  of	   fiscal	   tightening	  with	  major	  cuts	   to	  the	  public	  wage	  bill,	   transfers	  and	  investments35.	   Notably,	   this	   second	   round	   of	   stabilization	   took	   place	   in	   an	  atmosphere	  of	  remarkable	  partisan	  consensus	  as	  the	  main	  opposition	  party,	  Fine	  Gael	  decided	  to	  externally	  support	  it	  in	  parliamentary	  voting36.	  	  Political	   consensus	   behind	   fiscal	   stabilization	   also	   manifested	   itself	   in	   the	  emergence	  of	  an	  important	  social	  pact,	  the	  Programme	  for	  National	  Recovery	  in	  1987.	   This	   pact	   embedded	   fiscal	   stabilization	   in	   an	   overarching	   accord	   among	  the	  government,	   trade	  unions	  and	  employers	  about	  cooperation	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  international	   competitiveness37.	   It	   lent	   further	   legitimacy	   to	   the	   austerity	  measures	   of	   the	   minority	   Fianna	   Fail	   government38	   and	   ensured	   the	   active	  cooperation	  of	  public	   sector	  unions,	  whose	   commitment	   to	  wage	   restraint	  was	  important	   in	   keeping	   the	   public	   wage	   bill	   down39,	   as	   they	   had	   considerable	  capacity	  to	  make	  life	  difficult	  for	  the	  government	  due	  to	  their	  strike	  potential40.	  Beyond	  its	  practical	  relevance,	  the	  consent	  of	  unions	  to	  an	  essentially	  neoliberal	  stabilization	  package	  –	  which	  largely	  conformed	  to	  the	  business	  agenda41	  –	  also	  revealed	   union	   leaders’	   conviction	   that	   such	   sacrifices	   were	   inevitable.	   They	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34Alesina	  and	  Perotti	  1996,	  Honohan	  1999	  35	  Giavazzi	  and	  Pagano	  1990,	  Alesina	  and	  Perotti	  1996	  36	  Fine	  Gael	  officially	   announced	  –	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	  Tallaght	   strategy	  –	   that	   it	  would	   support	   the	  minority	  Fianna	  Fail	  government	   in	  passing	  any	  measure	   that	  helps	   fiscal	  consolidation	  (Marsh	  and	  Mitchell	  1999,	  Teague	  and	  Donaghey	  2009)	  37	  Culpepper	  2008	  38	  Baccaro	  and	  Lim	  2007,	  Baccaro	  and	  Simoni	  2008	  39	  Murphy	  1992,	  Marsh	  and	  Mitchell	  1999,	  Dellapiane	  and	  Hardiman	  2012	  40	  Baccaro	  and	  Simoni	  2008	  41	  Baccaro	  and	  Lim	  2007	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were	   concerned	   about	   a	   Thatcher-­‐style	   all-­‐out	   attack	   on	   unions	   and	   eager	   to	  ensure	   some	  degree	  of	   influence	  on	  policy-­‐making	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   a	   neoliberal	  turn42.	   Moreover,	   they	   had	   learnt	   from	   their	   inability	   to	   achieve	   real	   welfare	  improvements	   for	   their	   members	   through	   militancy	   throughout	   the	   1980s43.	  They	  contented	  themselves	  with	  tax	  cuts	  in	  return	  for	  losses	  in	  transfers	  and	  for	  wage	  restraint44,	  accepting	  that	  this	  was	  the	  most	  they	  could	  achieve	  for	  workers	  in	   the	   given	   situation.	   Although	   some	   affiliated	   unions	   opposed	   the	   pact,	   peak	  associations	  strongly	  pushed	  for	  accepting	  it	  and	  it	  was	  eventually	  adopted45.	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   political	   momentum	   to	   stabilize	   public	   finances	   started	   to	   gather	  early	   in	   Ireland	   and	   it	  was	  progressively	   reinforced	  until	   fiscal	   problems	  were	  definitively	   resolved.	   Although	   the	   two	   main	   rounds	   of	   austerity	   differed	   in	  composition	   –	   the	   first	   one	   relied	  mostly	   on	   tax	   increases	   on	   households,	   the	  second	   on	   expenditure	   cuts	   –	   the	   incidence	   of	   the	   sacrifices	  was	   similar.	   Both	  programmes	  shielded	  the	  corporate	  sector,	  but	  affected	  large	  swathes	  of	  society	  without	   much	   differentiation.	   According	   to	   voting	   data,	   the	   two	   large	   parties	  calculated	   well	   in	   choosing	   austerity,	   as	   the	   electorate	   acquiesced	   in	   these	  policies.	  Although	  Fine	  Gael’s	  vote	  plunged	  in	  the	  1987	  election	  –	  after	  it	  carried	  out	  the	  first	  round	  of	  fiscal	  tightening	  –	  this	  seems	  less	  to	  do	  with	  austerity	  per	  se	  than	  with	   the	   party’s	   failure	   to	   definitively	   address	   the	   debt	   problem,	   because	  the	  votes	  lost	  by	  Fine	  Gael	  went	  to	  the	  newly	  formed	  Progressive	  Democrats	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ibid.	  43	  Even	  though	  unions	  managed	  to	  achieve high nominal wages in the period between 1980 and 1987, they 
wound up with lower real take-home pay because of the joint effect of high inflation and fiscal drag	  (ibid).	  44	  Dellapiane	  and	  Hardiman	  2012	  45	  On	  the	  internal	  divisions	  among	  different	  union	  associations	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  internal	  decision	  making	  institutions	  helped	  to	  forge	  support	  for	  the	  National	  Programme	  for	  Recovery,	  see	  Baccaro	  (2003).	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embraced	  fiscal	  rectitude	  more	  openly	  than	  any	  of	  the	  old	  parties46.	  Apart	  from	  this	  large	  shift,	  the	  vote	  shares	  of	  the	  parties	  were	  fairly	  stable	  in	  the	  1980s.	  The	  eagerness	   of	   the	   major	   parties	   for	   fiscal	   stabilization	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   have	  alienated	   their	   voters.	   Unions	   also	   benefited	   from	   cooperating	   in	   the	   second	  round	   of	   tightening.	   After	   a	   long	   period	   of	   decline	   in	   the	   1980s,	   membership	  numbers	   started	   to	   increase	  again	  after	   the	  historic	   compromise	  of	  1987.	   Irish	  society	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  resent	   its	  political	   class	   for	   fiscal	  pain	  even	   though	   the	  rise	  of	  the	  Celtic	  tiger	  and	  the	  spectacular	  dividends	  of	  fiscal	  stabilization	  could	  not	  be	  foreseen	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
Suspense	  and	  belated	  stabilization	  in	  Italy	  
	  The	  contrast	  with	  Italy	  could	  have	  hardly	  been	  more	  pronounced.	  Although	  the	  discourse	   of	   fiscal	   policy-­‐making	   was	   dominated	   by	   the	   objective	   of	  “risanamento”	   as	  ministers	   and	   central	   bank	   officials	   repeatedly	   called	   for	   the	  stabilization	  public	   finances,	   net	   borrowing	   stayed	   firmly	   above	   ten	  percent	   of	  the	  GDP	  and	  debt	  grew	  unabatedly	  throughout	  the	  1980s47.	  The	  primary	  deficit	  narrowed	   very	   slowly	   and	   the	   pace	   of	   the	   correction	   fell	   behind	   the	   rate	   of	  increase	   of	   the	   interest	   burden	   by	   far.	   Social	   security	   spending	   and	   the	   public	  sector	   wage	   bill	   even	   increased	   slightly	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   GDP	   during	   the	  decade,	   whereas	   other	   items	   stayed	   roughly	   stable48.	   Although	   corporate	   tax	  rates	  were	  raised	  significantly	   in	  1983,	   this	  had	   little	  effect	  on	  revenues	  due	  to	  the	   frequent	   use	   of	   tax	   rebates	   to	   help	   industry,	   and	   due	   to	   widespread	   tax	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Mair	  1990	  47	  Walsh	  1999,	  Radaelli	  2000	  48	  Morcaldo	  1993,	  Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2004	  
	   20	  
evasion49.	  The	  only	  major	  source	  of	  revenue	  growth	  was	  fiscal	  drag	  as	  inflation	  kept	  pushing	  personal	   incomes	   into	  ever-­‐higher	  brackets	   in	  a	  very	  progressive	  tax	   system,	   but	   this	   effect	   was	   undercut	   by	   the	   repeated	   adjustment	   of	   the	  brackets50.	   By	   1990,	   Italy	   overtook	   Ireland	   as	   the	   second	   most	   indebted	  developed	  country	  after	  Belgium,	  and	  debt	  growth	  showed	  no	  signs	  of	  stopping.	  	  Throughout	   the	  1980s,	   Italian	  governments	  were	  paralysed	   in	   the	   face	  of	   fiscal	  deterioration	  by	  intense	  redistributive	  conflict	  generated	  by	  deep	  economic	  and	  regional	  cleavages.	  Conflict	  between	  labour	  and	  capital	  was	  most	  intense	  in	  the	  industrialized	  North	  and	  it	  had	  come	  to	  a	  head	  in	  the	  late-­‐1960s	  and	  the	  early-­‐1970s51.	  In	  this	  tempestuous	  period,	  labour	  extorted	  many	  policy	  concessions	  –	  in	  the	  form	  of	  generous	  pensions	  and	  welfare	  payments	  as	  well	  as	  a	  tax	  reform	  –	  through	  waves	   of	   strikes	   and	   demonstrations52.	   As	   businesses	   tried	   to	   protect	  themselves	   from	   the	   increased	   tax	   pressure,	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   within	   the	  capitalist	   class	   itself	   became	   more	   prominent.	   Large	   business	   lobbied	   the	  government	   for	   tax-­‐rebates	   and	   exemptions,	   whereas	   small	   family	   enterprises	  and	   the	   self-­‐employed	   –	   not	   being	   able	   to	   count	   on	   such	   targeted	   relief	   –	  increasingly	  fled	  into	  evasion53.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  fourth	  group	  with	  a	  distinct	  set	   of	   fiscal	   interests	   emerged	   as	   the	   population	   of	   the	   underdeveloped	   South	  asserted	  its	  claim	  for	  a	  share	  of	  public	  spending.	  Public	  employment	  and	  public	  investment	   flowing	   to	   the	   Southern	   provinces	  were	   increased	   after	   a	   series	   of	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  Guerra	  1993	  50	  Giavazzi	  and	  Spaventa	  1989	  51	  Sassoon	  1991,	  Partridge	  1998	  52	  Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2003	  53	  Guerra	  1993,	  Della	  Sala	  1997	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riots	  and	  demonstrations	  made	  clear	   the	  resentment	  with	   low	   living	  standards	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  employment	  opportunities	  in	  the	  region54.	  	  By	  the	  1980s,	  the	  social	  strife	  of	  the	  1970s	  had	  not	  only	  left	  a	  gaping	  hole	  in	  the	  budget,	   but	   also	   revealed	   strong	   polarization	   of	   interests	   among	   groups	   with	  significant	   policy	   influence.	   Formally,	   labour	   did	   not	   have	   a	   say	   in	   the	   policy-­‐making	  arena,	  as	   the	  Communist	  party	  was	  permanently	  kept	   in	  opposition	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  pentapartito	  coalitions	  of	  the	  1980s55,	  and	  policy	  coordination	  with	  unions	  broke	  down	  in	  the	  early	  1980s56.	  However,	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  1970s	  had	   demonstrated	   the	   ability	   and	   willingness	   of	   labour	   to	   use	   strikes	   as	   a	  powerful	  weapon	  to	  defend	  its	  fiscal	  interests.	  This	  practically	  ruled	  out	  cuts	  to	  pensions	  or	  welfare	  or	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  personal	  income	  tax	  on	  lower	  incomes	  throughout	  the	  period.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  other	  three	  groups	  had	  important	  leverage	   over	   the	   pentapartito	   governments	   –	   most	   importantly	   over	   the	  dominant	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	  –	  that	  made	  successive	  governments	  wary	  of	  making	   adjustments	   to	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   budget.	   Small	   businesses	   and	   the	  self-­‐employed	  –	  an	  unusually	  numerous	  group	  in	  Italy	  –	  had	  traditionally	  formed	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats’	  voter	  base.	  They	  did	  not	  shy	  away	  from	  threatening	   to	   withdraw	   their	   support	   when	   the	   government	   attempted	   to	  introduce	   a	   reform	   to	   rein	   in	   tax	   evasion	   in	   198457.	   Large	   enterprises,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	   exerted	   strong	   lobby	  pressure	  on	  Christian	  Democrats	   to	  maintain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Ginsborg	  1990,	  Partridge	  1998,	  Alesina	  et	  al	  1999,	  Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2004)	  55	  Beside	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  and	  three	  small	  right-­‐of-­‐centre	  parties,	  these	  coalitions	  also	  always	  included	  the	  Socialist	  Party.	  However,	  by	  1980,	  the	  Socialist	  constituency	  was	  geared	  more	  towards	  white-­‐collar	  and	  managerial	  professions	  than	  towards	  workers	  (Ginsborg	  1990).	  56	  Regini	  and	  Regalia	  1997,	  Bull	  2004	  57	  La	  Palombara	  1987,	  Ginsborg	  1990	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protection	   from	   increased	   corporate	   taxes58.	   The	   interests	   of	   the	   South	   were	  defended	  by	  a	  strong	  faction	  of	  politicians	  among	  Christian	  Democrats,	  who	  had	  traditionally	  secured	  votes	  for	  the	  party	  through	  operating	  clientelistic	  networks	  in	  this	  region59.	  They	  made	  sure	  that	  the	  public	  jobs	  and	  infrastructure	  contracts	  needed	  to	  maintain	  the	  clientelistic	  ties	  were	  continuously	  available60.	  	  	  Since	  all	  four	  significant	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  were	  able	  and	  willing	  to	  defend	  their	   fiscal	   priorities,	   it	   was	   impossible	   to	   design	   a	   politically	   viable	   austerity	  package	   that	   would	   have	   been	   large	   enough	   to	   restore	   fiscal	   balance.	   By	   the	  second	   half	   of	   the	   decade,	   one	  major	   correction	   package	  was	   announced	   after	  another,	   as	   policy	   makers	   grew	   anxious	   about	   the	   fiscal	   situation,	   but	   in	   the	  absence	   of	   significant	   adjustments	   to	   any	   of	   the	   major	   spending	   items	   or	   a	  substantial	   increase	   of	   revenues,	   they	   remained	   but	   gestures61.	   Savings	   were	  achieved	   in	   health	   care	   spending	   and	   revenues	  marginally	   increased	   with	   the	  introduction	  of	  a	  tax	  on	  interest.	  Public	  finances	  also	  benefited	  from	  the	  effect	  of	  fiscal	  drag	  and	  from	  windfall	  revenues	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  decade62.	  These	  improvements	  helped	  to	  gradually	  eliminate	  the	  primary	  deficit	  by	  1990,	  but	  as	  the	   interest	   burden	   had	   continuously	   increased	   with	   the	   piling	   up	   of	   debt,	  borrowing	  stayed	  consistently	  around	  twelve	  percent	  of	  the	  GDP.	  By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  decade,	  debt	  was	  as	  large	  as	  the	  GDP	  and	  still	  persistently	  growing.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Ruzza	  and	  Fella	  2007	  59	  Tarrow	  1977,	  Hopkin	  and	  Ignazi	  2008	  60	  Maintenance	  of	  these	  clientele	  networks	  was	  especially	  important	  since	  Christian	  Democrats	  were	  getting	  growing	  support	  in	  the	  South,	  while	  their	  vote	  share	  was	  declining	  in	  every	  other	  region	  (Cattaneo).	  61	  Bosi	  et	  al	  2003,	  European	  Economy	  1993	  62	  Giavazzi	  and	  Spaventa	  1989,	  Guerra	  1993	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In	   the	   tense	  political	   climate	   of	   the	   early	  1980s,	   intransigently	  defending	   their	  constituencies’	   fiscal	   interests	   seemed	   like	   the	   safest	   strategy	   for	   both	   the	  Christian	  Democrats	  and	  the	  unions.	  However,	  as	  fiscal	  problems	  started	  to	  bear	  on	   international	   competitiveness	   through	   high	   inflation	   in	   the	   fixed-­‐exchange	  rate	  regime	  of	  the	  European	  Monetary	  System63,	  both	  of	  these	  main	  protagonists	  of	   Italian	  politics	   of	   the	   time	  had	   to	   face	   increasing	   resentment	   amongst	   those	  supporters	  whose	   livelihood	   depended	   on	   exporting	   and/or	   import-­‐competing	  industries.	   Large	   enterprises	   were	   badly	   affected	   as	   well	   as	   those	   small	  businesses	  and	  self-­‐employed	  entrepreneurs	  who	  were	  producing	  for	  the	  export	  markets	   in	   the	   industrial	   districts	   of	   Northern	   and	   Central	   Italy	   or	   engaged	   in	  tourism64.	   Confindustria,	   the	   peak	   industry	   organization	   called	   ever	   more	  vehemently	  for	  immediate	  stabilization,	  while	  small	  entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  North	  started	   to	   defect	   from	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   fast-­‐rising	  political	   movement	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   lega-­‐s,	   who	   called	   for	   a	   smaller	   state,	   the	  consolidation	   of	   public	   finances	   and	   low	   tax	   rates65.	   The	   setbacks	   suffered	   by	  manufacturing	   were	   also	   reflected	   in	   a	   loss	   of	   employment,	   which	   affected	  mainly	  younger	  workers66.	  Passive	   in	   the	   face	  of	   their	  members’	  plight,	  unions	  were	   heavily	   losing	  membership	   among	   active	   workers	   and	   their	   relationship	  with	  the	  remaining	  active	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  progressively	  deteriorated67.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Even	  though	  the	  Bank	  of	  Italy	  was	  freed	  from	  the	  automatic	  commitment	  to	  act	  as	  a	  buyer	  of	  last	  resort	  for	  government	  bonds	  in	  1981,	  the	  monetization	  of	  the	  debt	  did	  not	  completely	  stop	  throughout	  the	  1980s,	  fuelling	  a	  sizeable	   inflation	  differential	  with	  Germany	  and	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  EMS-­‐bloc	  (Fratianni	  and	  Spinelli	  1997,	  Bruni	  et	  al.	  1989,	  Epstein	  and	  Schor,	  1989).	  Even	  though	  the	  lira	  was	  realigned	  several	  times	  in	  the	  1980s,	  the	  nominal	  depreciations	  achieved	  in	  negotiations	  with	  their	  EMS-­‐partners	  did	  not	  make	  up	  for	  the	  cumulative	   inflation	  differential	   in	   this	  period.	  The	   lira	  appreciated	  by	  42	  per	  cent	   in	   real	   terms	  between	  1978	  and	  1991	  (Fratianni	  and	  Spinelli	  1997).	  64	   Generally,	   large-­‐scale	   manufacturing	   –	   such	   as	   the	   production	   of	   cars	   and	   white	   goods	   –	   was	   worst	  affected,	  but	  some	  of	  the	  traditional	  products	  of	  small	  enterprises	  of	  the	  industrial	  districts	  –	  such	  as	  textile	  and	  apparel	  or	  leather	  goods	  –	  also	  lost	  market	  share	  in	  this	  period	  (Guerrieri	  and	  Milana	  1990).	  	  65	  Bull	  and	  Newell	  1993,	  Walsh	  1999,	  Diamanti	  2007,	  Hopkin	  and	  Ignazi	  2008	  66	   Between	   1980	   and	   1990,	   10	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   jobs	   were	   lost	   in	   the	   manufacturing	   sector.	   In	   the	   same	  period,	  unemployment	  grew	  from	  around	  7	  to	  almost	  10	  per	  cent.	  (Bertola	  and	  Garibaldi	  2002)	  67	  Regini	  and	  Regalia	  1997	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  Eventually,	   a	   decade	   of	   lira	   appreciation,	   dwindling	   market	   shares,	   declining	  profitability	   and	   declining	   unemployment	   came	   to	   a	   head	   in	   the	   early	   1990s68	  and	   the	  discontent	  of	   large	   corporations,	   export-­‐oriented	   small	  businesses	  and	  organized	   labour	   undermined	   the	   political	   system69	   that	   rested	   on	   the	  implacable	  opposition	  of	  the	  labour	  movement	  to	  the	  pentapartito	  coalitions.	  The	  system	  came	  down	  with	  a	  loud	  crash	  in	  1992.	  After	  an	  “electoral	  earthquake”	  in	  which	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party’s	  vote	  share	  plummeted	  and	  the	  Lega	  rose	  like	  a	  comet,	  an	  epic	  corruption	  scandal	  sealed	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  old	  political	  elite70.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  representatives	  of	   large	  business	  and	  labour	  reversed	  their	  earlier	  hostility	  and	  showed	  themselves	  willing	  to	  cooperate	  and	  to	  make	  mutual	  sacrifices	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  fiscal	  stabilization.	  Unions	  agreed	  to	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  automatic	  wage	  indexation	  system71	  and	  to	  (deferred)	  pension	  reforms,	  whereas	  businesses	  acquiesced	  in	  the	  raising	  of	  the	  corporate	  taxes.	  In	  the	  later	  years	  of	  the	  1990s,	  both	  large	  business	  and	  labour	  threw	  their	  weight	  behind	  the	  centre-­‐left	  electoral	  coalition,	  which	  perpetuated	  these	  policies	  when	  in	  government	  in	  the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   decade.	   Small	   businesses	   in	   the	   export-­‐oriented	   North	  tacitly	   supported	   these	   policies	   through	   the	   Lega	   Nord72,	   even	   though	   higher	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Unemployment	  rose	  to	  new	  highs,	  real	  growth	  slowed	  considerably	  and	  exports	  shrunk	  in	  real	  terms.	  In	  1992,	   the	  country	  went	   through	  a	  major	  currency	  crisis	  and	  had	   to	   leave	   the	  European	  Monetary	  System	  (Ameco,	  Ginsborg	  2001).	  69	  See	  also	  Golden	  2004.	  70	  Cattaneo,	  Pasquino	  2004	  71	   The	   so-­‐called	   scala	   mobile	   had	   been	   a	   major	   bone	   of	   contention	   between	   employers	   and	   labour	  throughout	   the	  1980s	   and	   it	  was	   seen	   as	   the	  most	   important	   shackle	   on	   the	   competitiveness	  of	   industry	  (Baccaro	  2002,	  Baccaro	  et	  al	  2003,	  Baccaro	  and	  Lim	  2007,	  Baccaro	  and	  Simoni	  2008,	  Culpepper	  2002	  and	  2008).	  Its	  abolition	  provided	  large	  gains	  to	  employers	  in	  the	  form	  of	  falling	  labour	  costs,	  an	  increasing	  profit	  share	  and	  growing	  net	  return	  on	  capital	  (Ameco,	  Torrini	  2005)	  72	  Although	   the	  Lega	  ran	  with	   the	  centre-­‐right	  electoral	   coalition	   in	   the	  1994	  election,	   it	  quickly	  defected	  from	   the	   centre-­‐right	  government	  when	   it	  became	  clear	   that	   it	  would	   reverse	  earlier	  austerity	  measures.	  For	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   1990s,	   the	   Lega	   provided	   extra-­‐governmental	   support	   to	   the	   continuation	   of	   fiscal	  stabilization.	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corporate	  rates	  and	  the	  tougher	  stance	  on	  tax-­‐evasion	  significantly	  increased	  the	  fiscal	  pressure	  on	  this	  group73.	  	  	  Unlike	   in	   Ireland,	   fiscal	   stabilization	   required	   a	   spectacular	   breakthrough,	   a	  dramatic	   reversal	   of	   the	   behaviour	   of	   large	   socio-­‐economic	   groups,	   who	   had	  earlier	   been	   adamant	   to	   resist	   fiscal	   sacrifices.	   This	   reversal	   involved	  momentous	  political	  changes,	  including	  the	  complete	  replacement	  of	  old	  parties	  with	   new	   ones,	   important	   constitutional	   changes	   and	   the	   volte-­face	   of	   social	  partners.	  The	  resulting	  historic	  compromise	  was	  a	  carefully	  negotiated	  quid	  pro	  
quo	  where	  the	  sacrifices	  of	  each	  distinct	  group	  were	  matched	  by	  sacrifices	  of	  the	  others,	  highlighting	  the	  wide	  differences	  in	  policy	  preferences	  that	  the	  historical	  bargain	  needed	  to	  bridge.	  These	  large	  concessions	  were	  not	  made	  lightly:	  it	  took	  the	   cumulative	   economic	  weight	   of	   a	   decade	   of	   dysfunctional	   policies	   to	   force	  groups	  of	  such	  polarized	  fiscal	  interests	  to	  come	  around	  to	  compromise.	  	  
Ireland	  and	  Italy	  fight	  debt	  again	  	  In	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   financial	   and	   economic	   crisis,	   Italy	   and	   Ireland	   find	  themselves	   in	   the	  same	  shoes	  again.	  Although	   they	  had	   followed	  very	  different	  fiscal	  trajectories	  in	  the	  2000s,	  they	  both	  face	  an	  excessive	  debt	  stock	  and	  large	  fiscal	  imbalances	  in	  the	  second	  decade	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  In	  Italy,	  this	  is	  partly	   the	   result	   of	   longer-­‐term	   problems	   with	   sluggish	   growth,	   high	  unemployment	  and	  persistent,	  if	  moderate,	  borrowing	  and	  partly	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  great	  recession.	  In	  Ireland,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  was	  the	  spectacular	  collapse	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Ginsborg	  2003,	  Brugiavini	  and	  Galasso	  2004	  
	   26	  
of	  the	  banking	  sector	  and	  the	  disastrous	  economic	  performance	  of	  many	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  devastated	  the	  country’s	  previously	  robust	  public	  finances.	  Notwithstanding	   the	   background	   of	   their	   fiscal	   problems,	   the	   countries	   faced	  very	   similar	   challenges	   by	   late	   2010,	   as	   financial	   markets	   started	   to	   show	  increasing	  reluctance	  to	  finance	  countries	  with	  large	  fiscal	  imbalances	  and	  heavy	  debt	   stocks	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  Greek	  debt	   crisis.	  The	   two	   countries’	   responses	  seem	   to	   diverge	   in	   similar	   ways	   in	   the	   present	   as	   they	   did	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	  1990s.	  	  Ireland’s	  adjustment	  has	  been	  swift,	   it	  has	  gone	  practically	  unchallenged	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum	  and	  it	  has	  required	  fiscal	  sacrifices	  indiscriminately	  across	  society.	  A	  decisive	   austerity	  programme	  was	   launched	  as	   early	   as	  2008	  by	   the	  
Fianna	   Fail	   government,	   before	   the	   full	   scale	   of	   the	   banking	   disaster	   became	  clear	  and	   it	  was	  progressively	  reinforced	  each	  year	  as	   the	  proportions	  of	   fiscal	  problems	  were	  realized74.	  After	  Fianna	  Fail	  was	  thrown	  out	  of	  government	  in	  the	  2011	  elections,	  its	  austerity	  programme	  was	  continued	  without	  hesitation	  by	  the	  coalition	  of	  Fine	  Gael	  and	  the	  Socialists.	  Although	  unions	  failed	  to	  play	  the	  central	  coordinating	  and	   legitimizing	  role	   they	  performed	   in	  1987	  –	   in	   fact,	   the	  Fianna	  
Fail	  government	  deliberately	  chose	  to	  act	  unilaterally	  in	  2008	  and	  2009,	  ignoring	  the	  practices	  of	  social	  partnership	  of	  the	  previous	  two	  decades	  –	  this	  seemed	  to	  make	  little	  political	  difference	  or	  to	  undermine	  the	  political	  legitimacy	  of	  painful	  cuts	  and	  tax	  increases75.	  With	  remarkable	  similarity	  to	  the	  austerity	  of	  the	  1980s,	  austerity	   of	   the	   2010s,	   affected	   large	   swathes	   of	   society	   without	   much	  differentiation,	   while	   mostly	   shielding	   the	   corporate	   sector.	   Welfare	   spending	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Dellepiane	  and	  Hardiman	  2012	  75	  Culpepper	  and	  Regan	  2014	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and	   public	   wage	   expenditures	   were	   substantially	   cut,	   income	   taxes	   as	   well	   as	  VAT	  increased.	  	  Italy’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  crisis,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  gave	  further	  evidence	  that	  fiscal	  adjustment	  in	  that	  country	  is	  never	  easy:	  it	  takes	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  and	  great	  political	  turmoil	  to	  overcome	  intense	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  to	  put	  into	  place,	  it	  elicits	  strong	  societal	   disgruntlement	   and	   it	   involves	   very	   selective	  means	   of	   addressing	   the	  fiscal	   problem.	  Despite	   the	   swift	   increase	  of	   the	   spread	  on	   Italian	  bonds,	   fiscal	  adjustment	  did	  not	  start	  in	  earnest	  until	  the	  very	  end	  of	  2011.	  Although	  a	  three-­‐year	  delay	  relative	  to	  Ireland	  is	  much	  less	  significant	  than	  the	  decade	  in	  the	  wake	  of	   the	   oil	   crisis,	   it	   is	   still	   considerable	   in	   light	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   was	   widely	  perceived	   by	   mid-­‐2011that	   a	   debt	   crisis	   was	   imminent.	   It	   took	   extraordinary	  political	  measures	  –	  the	  ousting	  of	  the	  elected	  centre-­‐right	  government	  mid-­‐term	  and	  replacing	  it	  with	  a	  technocratic	  government	  in	  November	  2011	  –	  to	  launch	  a	  first	  austerity	  effort.	  Although	  the	  technocratic	  government	  successfully	  put	  into	  place	   cuts	   in	   pension	   spending	   as	   well	   as	   VAT-­‐	   and	   excise-­‐increases,	   the	  measures	   triggered	   political	   disorder	   and	   societal	   discontent	   that	   raise	  important	  questions	  about	   the	   longer-­‐term	  viability	  of	   the	  present	   adjustment.	  The	   technocratic	   government	   did	   not	   last:	   it	   resigned	   when	   it	   failed	   to	   get	  parliamentary	  support	  for	  its	  reforms.	  In	  its	  wake	  it	  left	  a	  disgruntled	  electorate,	  a	   quarter	   of	   whom	   decided	   to	   cast	   its	   votes	   for	   a	   protest	   party,	   the	   Five	   Star	  Movement,	   in	   the	  2013	  elections	  and	  a	  party	   system	   in	  utter	   turmoil,	  with	   the	  dominant	   party	   of	   the	   right	   splitting	   up	   and	   the	   dominant	   party	   of	   the	   left	  undergoing	   internal	   revolution.	  The	   consensus	   and	   compromise	   that	  made	   the	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adjustment	  of	  the	  early	  1990s	  a	  lasting	  effort	  is	  yet	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  electoral	  and	  partisan	  reordering.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  When	  Ireland	  and	  Italy	  regained	  control	  over	  their	  runaway	  debt	  growth	  in	  the	  1980s	   and	   1990s,	   their	   successful	   policy	   adjustment	   puzzled	   scholars	   of	  comparative	   political	   economy.	   How	   could	   countries	   with	   such	   weak	  governments,	   with	   centrifugal	   electoral	   systems	   and	   lacking	   coordinated	  bargaining	   mechanism	   put	   into	   place	   such	   decisive	   -­‐	   and	   painful	   -­‐	   policy	  reforms?	  Solutions	  to	  the	  puzzle	  zoomed	  in	  on	  the	  social	  pacts	  that	  accompanied	  -­‐	   and	   ushered	   in	   -­‐	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	   reforms.	   It	  was	   argued	   that	   social	   pacts	  introduced	  the	  otherwise	  missing	  elements	  of	  coordination,	  they	  legitimized	  the	  actions	  of	  weak	  governments	  and	  mobilized	  support	  in	  broad	  sections	  of	  society.	  It	  was	  also	  shown	  how	  common	  understandings	  of	   the	  policy	  problem	  at	  hand	  provided	  the	  ideational	  foundations	  for	  social	  pacts.	  	  	  However,	  focusing	  on	  the	  common	  streak	  of	  the	  two	  adjustment	  stories	  conceals	  many	   important	   differences	   that	   undermine	   the	   argument	   for	   the	   centrality	   of	  social	  pacts.	  The	  most	  consequential	  difference	  from	  a	  policy	  perspective	  is	  the	  difference	   in	   the	   speed	  with	  which	   the	   two	   countries	   adjusted	   to	   very	   similar	  challenges.	  A	  decade	  of	  delay	  cost	  Italy	  a	  lot	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  debt	  overhang	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  necessary	  fiscal	  sacrifices.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  paper	  also	  showed	   that	   adjustment	  was	  much	  more	   conflictual	   in	   Italy,	   it	   involved	  much	  greater	   political	   upheaval	   and	   a	   much	   clearer	   quid	   pro	   quo	   bargain	   between	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different	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  within	  the	  polity.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  apparent	  similarities	  in	  the	  institutional	  solutions	  leading	  to	  successful	  adjustment	  in	  both	  cases	  overlie	  a	  host	  of	  fundamental	  differences	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  policy	  reform	  in	  the	  two	  countries,	  which	  have	  relevance	  not	  only	  for	  policy	  outcomes	  but	  also	  for	  the	   explanatory	   value	   of	   arguments	   centring	   on	   institutional	   innovations	   like	  social	  pacts.	  	  The	   recent	   experiences	   of	   Italy	   and	   Ireland	  with	   renewed	   attempts	   at	   dealing	  with	   debt	   provide	   further	   evidence	   that	   social	   pacts	   are	   unlikely	   be	   universal	  institutional	  panacea	   for	   countries	   struggling	  with	  policy	  adjustment.	   In	   fact,	   it	  seems	  that	  social	  pacts	  just	  happened	  to	  be	  a	  vehicle	  for	  societal	  compromise	  in	  the	  past	  with	  little	  independent	  effect	  on	  the	  success	  of	  adjustment.	  Social	  pacts	  have	  been	  conspicuous	  by	  their	  absence	   from	  the	  politics	  of	  reform	  of	   the	  past	  years	   as	   governments	  deliberately	   exclude	   social	   partners	   from	   shaping	  policy	  adjustment.	   Yet,	   adjustment	   happens	   even	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   institutionalized	  bargains.	  	  Differences	  in	  the	  pattern	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  policy	  adjustment,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  seem	   to	   persist.	   Just	   as	   in	   the	   1980s,	   adjustment	   takes	   longer,	   involves	   more	  intense	  political	  conflict	  and	  fundamental	  institutional	  reordering	  in	  Italy	  than	  in	  Ireland.	   The	   persistence	   of	   these	   divergent	   patterns	   highlight	   the	   fundamental	  differences	   in	   the	  way	   the	   two	   countries	   reach	   the	   socio-­‐political	   compromise	  necessary	   for	   policy	   reform,	   despite	   temporary	   institutional	   similarities.	   It	  underlines	  the	  important	  differences	  in	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  structures	  of	  the	  two	  countries:	   the	   presence	   of	   deep	   social	   cleavages	   in	   Italy	   and	   their	   absence	   in	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Ireland	  as	  well	  as	  the	  differential	  exposure	  of	  the	  two	  countries	  to	  international	  competition.	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